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I. General
Throughout its lengthy,' if not altogether illustrious, history, Canadian
competition legislation has been characterized by significant difficulties of
enforcement. These problems have stemmed largely from constitutional
limitations which has meant that, until recently, the law being applied has
been exclusively criminal in nature. The situation today is not very different
in that enforcement issues in this field continue to preoccupy the legislators
and the courts.2
During the past several years there have been a number of conflicting
constitutional law decisions dealing with the federal government's authority
to legislate, and even to enforce, law in this area. While some of the
constitutional uncertainties have been resolved by the Supreme Court of
1. The first Canadian competition legislation was enacted in 1884, one year prior to the
Sherman Act in the United States.
2. See in this regard the discussion following under the headings "III. Constitutional Law
Issues," "IV. Charter of Rights" and "V. Competition Law Reform."
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Canada,3 there continue to be significant undecided issues concerning the
federal government's constitutional authority to enact laws which confer
civil jurisdictions in regard to competition law matters. These continuing
uncertainties have a particular significance for the direction of proposed
competition law reform which is generally moving away from the traditional
criminal law basis and toward the creation of new civil law jurisdictions.
Some of these uncertainties are fairly basic. For example, it is still not clear
(there are a number of conflicting judicial decisions on the point) that the
private damage action remedy which has been in the Combines Investiga-
tion Act (the Act)4 since 1976, is constitutionally valid.5
More recently, constitutional issues have surfaced from another direc-
tion. In 1982, the Canadian Constitution was amended to provide for a
Charter of Rights 6 which operates as a restraint on the otherwise supreme
legislative authority (within its area of legislative competence) of the federal
Parliament. Provisions of the Charter relating to unlawful search and sei-
zure in particular have been effectively applied by a number of enterprising
would-be accused in potential combines prosecutions to defeat the use by
federal combines law enforcement officials of the traditional search and
seizure procedures provided in the Act.
A third, perhaps more significant, development in terms of Canadian
competition law enforcement is the process of legislative reform. One may
be forgiven for thinking that proposals for reform of the law in this area are
not a new development. Indeed, debate concerning Canadian competition
law reform has been ongoing, more or less continuously, for over fifteen
years, with relatively little actual new legislation to show for it. Recently,
however, this situation has shown signs of changing. In December 1985, the
federal Parliament gave first reading to a Bill (C-91) to amend the Combines
Investigation Act. 7 This Bill contained a number of major reforms which
3. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld the federal government's author-
ity to enact legislation conferring on the federal Attorney-General the power to enforce the
provisions of the Combines Investigation Act: Attorney-General Canada v. CN Transportation
Limited [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206.
4. REV. STAT. OF CAN. 1970 c.23, as amended by c. 10 (1st Supp.), c.10 (2nd Supp.) 1974-75-
76, c.76 and 1976-77 c.28.
5. The most recent decision, by the Federal Court of Appeal in Rocois Construction Inc. v.
Quebec Ready Mix Inc. et al. (Judgment rendered 1985, as yet unreported, Federal Court of
Appeal docket number A-705-79) upholds the constitutionality of this provision (§ 31.1 of the
Combines Investigation Act). See the discussion of this and other cases under the heading
"III. Constitutional Law Issues" infra. The Rocois case is on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
6. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms amendment to the Canadian Constitution (Constitu-
tion Act, 1982).
7. Bill C-91: "An Act to establish the Competition Tribunal and to amend the Combines
Investigation Act and the Bank Act and other Acts in consequence thereof"-First Reading,
Dec. 17, 1985.
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address some longstanding enforcement issues or problems. This legislation
(which has not yet become law and is not expected to become effective prior
to mid-1986 at the earliest) follows relatively closely the earlier legislative
reform proposals tabled by the then Liberal government in April 1984 in the
form of Bill C-298 which was not proceeded with due to a change in
government in September 1984. The proposed amendments attempt to deal
with major enforcement problems which have been encountered in the core
areas of the legislation, namely mergers, monopolies and trade-restraining
horizontal agreements. They also purport to resolve the longstanding de-
bate as to whether the civil law-based provisions of the legislation should be
adjudicated by the courts or a specialized competition tribunal.
There have been a number of recent decisions in the competition law field
which are of interest and which significantly clarify the application of the law
in areas which were previously uncertain. There have also been other
decisions which, from an enforcement point of view, further emphasize the
need to proceed with legislative reforms. Some of the more important recent
cases in this regard are discussed below.
Finally, we will be dealing with a somewhat different enforcement issue,
namely efforts to nullify the enforcement of foreign (i.e., United States)
antitrust laws in Canada, most recently exemplified by the Foreign Ex-
traterritorial Measures Act, 9 which came into force in February 1985. This
statute is but the latest in a series of legislative efforts to resist the extension
of foreign antitrust laws into the Canadian domestic law area.
While these subjects are obviously too comprehensive to be treated fully
in this article, an effort will be made to highlight, in the space available, the
more significant developments. By way of general background for readers
not familiar with the Act, it may be useful, as a preliminary matter, to
attempt to describe briefly its principal subject matter.
II. The Legislation in General
The first Canadian statute dealing with competition law matters was
enacted in 1888, one year before the Sherman Act. Historically, this legisla-
tion has been primarily criminal in character (largely due to constitutional
law considerations). However, in 1976 the Combines Investigation Act was
amended' ° to provide for a number of civil jurisdictions exercisable by the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (RTPC) and for the recovery of
private damages suffered as a consequence of a violation of one of the
criminal provisions of the Act or a breach of an order of the RTPC.
8. Bill C-29: "An Act to amend the Combines Investigation Act and the Bank Act and other
Acts in consequence thereof"-First Reading, Apr. 2, 1984.
9. STAT. OF CAN. 1984 c.49 (proclaimed in force Feb. 14, 1985).
10. STAT. OF CAN. 1974-75-76, c.76 s.12.
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A. CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
The criminal provisions of the Act cover the following practices or mat-
ters: conspiracies to limit competition unduly amongst competitors (price-
fixing, etc.); bid-rigging; implementation of international conspiracy; con-
spiracy relating to professional sport; unlawful merger; unlawful monopoly;
price discrimination; promotional allowances; predatory pricing (regional
price discrimination and selling at prices unreasonably low); price mainte-
nance; misleading advertising; and other miscellaneous offenses akin to
misleading advertising (e.g., double ticketing, pyramid selling, referral
selling, bait-and-switch selling, selling at above the advertised price, and
promotional contests).
B. CIVIL PROVISIONS
Civil law jurisdictions under the Act deal with the following: abuse of
industrial property rights; refusal to deal; consignment selling; exclusive
dealing; market restriction; tied selling; implementation of foreign judg-
ments and orders and foreign laws and directives; and refusal to supply by a
foreign supplier. The Act applies to services as well as articles, except in the
case of price discrimination. There are also a limited number of exemptions
for such things as collective bargaining activities, underwriters, amateur
sport and professional associations. In addition, the law has been inter-
preted as not applying in certain circumstances to government-regulated
businesses and conduct.
C. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The Combines Investigation Act is federal legislation. The Minister re-
sponsible for its administration and enforcement is the Minister of Con-
sumer and Corporate Affairs. The actual administration and enforcement of
the legislation is carried out by the Bureau of Competition Policy whose
principal officer is the Director of Investigation and Research (the Direc-
tor). Investigations under the Act are usually initiated by the Bureau. The
Act contains procedures for the compulsory disclosure of documentary
evidence and mandatory oral testimony by or on behalf of individuals or
corporations, although the recently enacted Charter of Rights has largely
invalidated the documentary discovery procedures under the Act. Most
criminal prosecutions under the Act are commenced in the ordinary crimi-
nal courts, although jurisdiction is also conferred upon the Federal Court of
Canada for certain purposes.
The Director has a duty of inquiry into matters that appear to call for
action under the legislation. He has access to information through the
utilization of any of three investigation procedures: search warrants issued
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under the Criminal Code, notices requiring persons to answer questions
orally under oath, and notices requiring persons to submit written informa-
tion on oath. The Director may discontinue an inquiry at any time. He may
also obtain by negotiation written undertakings regarding a party's future
conduct. If the evidence justifies having recourse to any formal remedial
powers, he may recommend prosecution to the Attorney-General or, in the
case of certain distribution practices, make application directly to the RTPC
for a prohibition order.
The RTPC's functions currently include: authorizing the use by the Direc-
tor of certain compulsory investigative powers (although not the search and
seizure powers under sec. 10 of the Act) and presiding over the taking of oral
evidence in the course of investigations by the Director; conducting further
hearings to review conduct at the request of the Director in cases where the
Director has concluded that criminal offenses have occurred; holding hear-
ings into general matters concerning competition policy; and considering
applications for prohibition orders directed to certain distribution practices.
There is also a civil cause of action conferred by sec. 31.1 of the Act
authorizing any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of
conduct constituting a criminal offense under the Act to sue for and recover
damages as a consequence of such loss or damage. A criminal conviction is
not a condition precedent to the civil action; however, prior criminal pros-
ecution resulting in conviction will undoubtedly facilitate a subsequent civil
action.
D. REVIEWABLE TRADE PRACTICES
The RTPC, upon application by the Director, is required to hold hear-
ings, and may issue prohibition and other orders relating to a variety of
distributive and other matters (not in themselves criminal offenses) which
are the subject of such hearings: refusals to supply (sec. 31.2); consignment
selling (where engaged in to avoid the prohibitions on price discrimination
and price maintenance) (sec. 31.3); exclusive dealing (sec. 31.4); tied selling
(sec. 31.4); market restriction (limiting a customer to selling only in a
defined market) (sec. 31.4); implementing a foreign judgment which
adversely affects competition in Canada (sec. 31.5); implementing a foreign
law or a directive outside of Canada that adversely affects competition in
Canada or which is designed to give effect to a foreign conspiracy or
arrangement that, if entered into in Canada, would have been in violation of
the Act (sec. 31.6); and refusal to supply a product to a person in Canada by
reason of the exertion of buying power outside of Canada by another person
(sec. 31.7).
E. MERGERS
The Act makes it an offense for one or more persons to acquire, "whether
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by purchase or lease of shares or assets or otherwise ... any control over or
interest in the whole or part of the business" of any person, whereby
competition is or is likely to be lessened to the detriment or against the
interest of the public." There have been relatively few Canadian merger
cases, yielding but one conviction which resulted from a plea of guilty. 12 The
existing case law suggests that proof of actual or likely detriment requires a
showing of almost a complete absence of actual and potential competition.
F. MONOPOLY
It is a criminal offense under the Act for anyone to be a party or privy to,
or to the formation of, a "monopoly." ' 3 This term is defined as a "situation
where one or more persons either substantially or completely control ... the
class or species of business in which they are engaged and have operated
such business or are likely to operate it to the detriment or against the
interest of the public. .. 4 Again, the government has had relatively little
success in bringing criminal prosecutions under this provision.
G. HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS
The Act prohibits, as a criminal law matter (punishable by fines and
imprisonment in appropriate cases), horizontal agreements which unduly
restrain or injure competition. ' 5 The most common type of infringing agree-
ment is the horizontal price-fixing agreement amongst competitors. Gener-
ally speaking, the law in this regard has been interpreted as requiring a high
degree of market concentration on the part of the participants, such that
they may effectively operate without any significant competition. The Act in
this regard does not create a per se offense (although there is a specific per se
offense treatment applied to bid-rigging offenses where formal bids are
submitted in a competition) but rather operates on a "rule of reason" basis.
There is also a suggestion in recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada' 6 that it may be necessary to demonstrate that the conspirators
actually intended to restrain competition unduly, rather than merely intend-
ing to enter into the agreement which in fact has that effect. One of these
cases further suggests that consciously parallel conduct which in fact dimin-
ishes competition may be beyond the purview of the conspiracy provisions
11. Combines Investigation Act, s.33 and s.2.
12. R. v. Electric Reduction Company of Canada Ltd. (1970) 61 C.P.R. 235.
13. Combines Investigation Act, s.33.
14. Combines Investigation Act, s.2.
15. Combines Investigation Act, s.32.
16. See in this regard the discussion of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Aetna
Insurance and Atlantic Sugar cases discussed infra under the heading "VI. Recent Cases,
A. Conspiracy."
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of the Act where such conduct lacks the necessary element of overt com-
munication.
H. PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The Act makes it an offense' 7 for a supplier of articles (the provision does
not apply to services) to discriminate in price (or other terms having finan-
cial impact) as between those of his customers who compete with one
another on any basis other than quantity or quality differences. The Cana-
dian price discrimination provision has no requirement for cost justification
in regard to volume price differences. It is sufficient that the lower priced
product is supplied in greater quantity to the favored customer than to the
customer who pays a higher price provided that both customers were given
the same opportunity. While there is no specific "meeting competition in
good faith" proviso to the Canadian price discrimination law, the section is
only violated where discriminatory discounts, etc., are granted as a part of a
practice of discriminating on the part of the supplier.
Generally speaking, volume discounts need not be structured on a pro-
portionate basis, but rather, may be established according to a plateau
structure and may be offered on either a single delivery or periodic purchase
basis. However, incentive discount schemes based on an increase in volume
over prior years' sales are ordinarily not structured to comply with the
requirements of the section.
I. PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES
A typical promotional allowance involves the supplier of an article or
service offering to defray a portion of the advertising or promotion costs
incurred by a retailer in connection with the sale of that product or service.
The provision in the Act18 requires such allowances to be offered on a
proportionate basis; i.e., so that each competing purchaser from the sup-
plier is granted an allowance proportionate to his purchases from the sup-
plier. Where any quid pro quos are required for the allowance, such as the
performance of some advertising service, such quid pro quos are similarly
required to be in proportion to the purchases from the supplier made by
those customers.
J. PREDATORY PRICING
There are two provisions dealing with predatory pricing in the Act, 19 one
17. Combines Investigation Act, s.34(1)(a).
18. Combines Investigation Act, s.35.
19. Combines Investigation Act, s.34(1)(b) and (c).
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that deals with regional price discrimination and another which prohibits
selling at prices unreasonably low. Both provisions require either a showing
of actual detriment to competition or proof of predatory intent. Both
require that the activity be part of a "policy." Both involve sales of "prod-
ucts," a term defined to include both articles and services. Both provisions
are intended to protect "primary line" competition.
K. PRICE MAINTENANCE
With the possible exception of misleading advertising, the price mainte-
nance section 20 is one of the most actively enforced provisions in the Act at
the present time.21 The success rate of the Bureau in obtaining convictions
under the provision is also high. The section makes it an offense for a
supplier, by agreement, threat, promise, or other like means, to attempt to
influence upward or to discourage the price at which another person supplies
or offers to supply or advertises a product in Canada. It is also an offense
under this section to refuse to supply a product to anyone because of his low
pricing policy. There is a deeming provision which effectively stipulates that
the suggestion of a price by a supplier to a distributor which does not indicate
that the distributor is not bound to accept the suggestion and would not be
affected in his business relations with the supplier by failing to act in
accordance with the suggestion, constitutes an attempt to influence the
person. There is a further deeming provision to the effect that where a
supplier, other than a retailer, places an advertisement indicating a resale
price for the product and fails to indicate that the product may be sold for
less than the suggested price shall be deemed to be guilty of an attempt to
influence upward the selling price of the product.
There are also a number of defenses to that portion of the price mainte-
nance provision as it relates to refusals to supply. Generally speaking, if it
can be shown that the denied outlet was making a practice of using the
product as a loss leader or was engaged in bait-and-switch selling, was
engaged in misleading advertising or was not providing the level of servicing
that the purchasers of such products might reasonably expect, no inference
unfavorable to the accused may be drawn by reason of the accused's refusal
to continue to supply products to such outlet.
20. Combines Investigation Act, s.38.
21. See DEP'T. OF CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH UNDER THE COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT (for the year ended
Mar. 31, 1985) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT], at App. II (1985), (indicating a high level
of enforcement activity under s. 38).
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L. MISLEADING ADVERTISING
The Act makes it an offense 22 for any person, for the purposes of promot-
ing the supply or use of a product or any business interest by any means, to
make a representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material
respect. It is also an offense to make representations in the nature of a
warranty or a guarantee of performance that are not based on an adequate
and proper test. 23 Another prohibited aspect of misleading advertising is the
making of a materially misleading representation to the public concerning
the prices at which a product or like products ordinarily have been sold.24
The Act contains a specific provision to the effect that the general impres-
sion conveyed by a representation, as well as its literal meaning, shall be
taken into account in determining whether or not the representation is false
or misleading in a material respect.25
The fines exigible under these provisions potentially can be very signifi-
cant. In one case a retailer was convicted and fined $1 million in regard to a
26particular promotion.
III. Constitutional Law Issues
Prior to 1976, when the Act was amended to provide for the recovery of
civil damages by private litigants who are able to demonstrate having
sustained loss or damage as a consequence of a violation of its criminal
prohibitions and to include a variety of civil law-based "reviewable trade
practices," Canadian antitrust or competition law had an exclusively crimi-
nal law basis. Although there have been several previous attempts by the
federal government to create civil jurisdictions in this field, such as the
Board of Commerce Act of 1919 and the Dominion Trade and Industry
Commission Act in the 1930s, such efforts consistently have been held to be
beyond its constitutional authority. As a consequence, the only constitu-
tionally assured basis for such legislation to date (which was confirmed by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Proprietary Articles Trade
Association v. the Attorney-General for Canada27) has been the federal
government's authority to make laws in relation to criminal matters. The
1976 amendments clearly are not yet safe from constitutional challenge and
it remains to be seen whether or not they will be sustained.
22. Combines Investigation Act, s.36(1)(a).
23. Combines Investigation Act, s.36(1)(b).
24. Combines Investigation Act, s.36(1)(d).
25. Combines Investigation Act, s.36(4).
26. R. v. Simpsons Sears Limited (unreported decision of His Honor Judge Ferguson in the
County Court Judge's Criminal Court for the Judicial District of York, Province of Ontario,
rendered May 13, 1983).
27. [1931] A.C. 310 (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).
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In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada in Direct Lumber Co. Ltd. v.
Western Plywood Company Limited28 held that, at least with respect to the
price discrimination provisions of the Act, Parliament did not intend to
confer private rights of action. The Court therefore denied relief to a
plaintiff seeking damages alleged to have been sustained by the discrimina-
tory pricing activities of the defendant. More recently it has been held by the
Supreme Court of Canada, 29 that a plaintiff asserting a common law con-
spiracy claim based on a violation of the Act (of which the defendants had
been convicted under sec. 32 of the Act), could not succeed and recover
damages for injuries sustained as a result of the conspiracy in circumstances
where it could not be shown that it was the intention of the defendants to
injure the plaintiff (their intention was found to be to protect their own
interests at the expense of the customers of the plaintiff).
Although the emergence of civil jurisdictions and remedies in the com-
petition law field in Canada is, as mentioned, of relatively recent origin,
these matters have been a principal focus of the debate which has raged over
competition law reform in Canada since the Economic Council of Canada,
following its review of inadequacies in the existing law in the late 1960s, first
recommended their inclusion in the legislation.
There is little doubt that the development of Canadian competition law
generally and the enforcement of the existing laws have been greatly ham-
pered by the lack of a clear authority on the part of the federal government
to legislate in this area on other than a criminal law basis and the need, in
terms of enforcing the law which we do have, of demonstrating violations of
its provisions according to the criminal law standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The enforcement problem has been particularly obvious in relation to
such matters as mergers and monopoly which the Act presently attempts to
regulate on a criminal law basis. As evidence of this, the government has yet
to be successful in a contested merger prosecution and its record in relation
to monopoly offenses is similarly unimpressive.
The extent to which the Canadian law is successful in expanding beyond
its historical limitations will be dependent upon the outcome of a number of
cases which are now beginning to probe the more constitutionally sensitive
provisions of the 1976 amendments. To date the litigation has focused on
three principal constitutional issues relating to: the provision for the recov-
ery of civil damages under sec. 31.1 of the Act; 30 the authority of the federal
28. [1962] S.C.R. 646 (Supreme Court of Canada).
29. B.C. Lightweight Aggregate Ltd. v. Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd. (1983) 145 D.L.R.
(3d) 385 (Supreme Court of Canada).
30. E.g., the Rocois case, supra note 5.
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Parliament to create the existing civil law jurisdiction over reviewable trade
practices 31 (provided in the 1976 amendments); and the authority (also
established by the 1976 amendments) of federal officials to institute and
conduct prosecutions and proceedings under the Act. 32 Although the Su-
preme Court of Canada has yet to rule on the first two of these issues, it has
recently confirmed, in Attorney-General Canada v. CN Transportation
Limited,33 the authority of federal officials to enforce the legislation and it
appears that it will not be very long before the other two issues receive
consideration by that Court.
In the CN Transportation case the Supreme Court upheld the power of the
federal Attorney-General to enforce the provisions of the Act, the majority
view being based on the federal government's power to legislate in relation
to criminal law. Significantly, however, three judges upheld the legislation
under the federal government's trade and commerce power. This is clearly
an important development for those cases awaiting consideration by the
Supreme Court involving provisions of the Act, such as the reviewable trade
practices and private damage action provisions, which most probably cannot
be characterized as criminal law.
Indeed, the Federal Court of Appeal in Re Bureau of Broadcast Measure-
ment v. Director of Investigation and Research,3 has already gone further in
upholding, in a strongly worded judgment, the civil reviewable trade prac-
tices jurisdiction (in this case over tied selling) of the RTPC by following the
minority view expressed in the CN Transportation case and upholding the
validity of this legislation under the federal authority to regulate trade and
commerce. The court in this case found the section in question to be part of a
complex regulatory scheme not aimed at a particular business or industry
but at the general regulation of trade and commerce throughout Canada for
the benefit of Canadians. The same can probably be said of the other
reviewable trade practice authorities exercised by the RTPC.
Section 31.1 of the Act provides for the recovery by a plaintiff of single
damages and a full indemnity for costs where the plaintiff is able to demon-
strate loss or damage suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute
an offense under the Act or a breach of an order of the RTPC or of any
court. There is no requirement that the defendant should have been con-
victed of such an offense under the Act or indeed that any criminal proceed-
ings should have been undertaken with respect thereto.
31. The most recent case in this area is the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the
BBM case, discussed infra.
32. Now decided by the Supreme Court in the CN Transportation case, infra.
33. [19831 2 S.C.R. 206 (Supreme Court of Canada).
34. (1984) 9 D.L.R. (4th) 600 (Federal Court of Appeal).
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The first case in which the constitutionality of this provision was fully
considered arose in Rocois Construction Inc. v. Quebec Ready Mix Inc.
et al.35 The trial court ruled that the civil damage action remedy was
unconstitutional on the basis that it related to matters of property and civil
rights and was not supportable under the trade and commerce or peace,
order and good government (POGG) authorities of the federal government
or as being properly ancillary to the federal government's powers to legislate
in respect of criminal law. However, late in 1985, the Federal Court of
Appeal reversed the lower court decision, 36 upholding the constitutional
validity of the legislation under the federal government's power to enact
legislation in relation to trade and commerce.
A trial court decision in an Ontario case, Seiko Time Canada Ltd. v.
Consumers Distributing Co. Ltd. , had also concluded that the section was
unconstitutional. In that case the plaintiff, suing the defendant principally in
a passing-off action, also sought to recover damages under sec. 31.1 on the
basis that the defendant had violated the misleading advertising provisions
of the Combines Investigation Act. While the plaintiff was successful in its
common law passing-off action, the court dismissed the claim under sec.
31.1 on the grounds that the provision was ultra vires the Canadian Parlia-
ment. (Although the decision was affirmed on appeal by the Ontario Court
of Appeal, the Court of Appeal expressly stated that, in upholding the lower
court decision, it was not to be considered as having agreed with the trial
judge that the private damage action provision was invalid.)
A contrary conclusion was reached in an Alberta case, Henuset Bros. Ltd.
v. Syncrude Canada.38 In that case, the plaintiff sought damages alleged to
have been suffered by it as a result of the rejection by the defendants of its
low bids to carry out certain pipeline construction projects. It was further
alleged that the reason for such rejection was that the defendants had
conspired to restrain competition unduly in the pipeline construction indus-
try. Counsel for the Crown argued that the legislation could be upheld under
the federal government's authority to make laws in respect of trade and
commerce, criminal law, and POGG. In the result the trial judge held sec.
31.1 to be constitutionally valid under the trade and commerce authority on
the basis that it was part of an overall legislative scheme for the general
regulation of trade and commerce throughout Canada. Although it affected
property and civil rights in the province to some degree, it was nevertheless
within the legislative competence of the federal government.
35. [1980], 1 F.C. 184 (Federal Court).
36. Rocois v. Quebec Ready Mix, supra note 5.
37. (1980), 50 C.P.R. (2d) 147 (Ontario Supreme Court).
38. (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 300 (Alberta Queen's Bench).
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Another recent decision on this point was rendered by the Ontario High
Court in City National Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd.39 in
which it was held that since the civil damage action remedy conferred by sec.
31.1 could not be said to be necessarily incidental to the administrative
scheme set up by the Act or truly necessary for the effective exercise of
Parliament's criminal law jurisdiction, the provision was ultra vires the
federal Parliament. However, this decision was recently reversed on appeal
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in a judgment released January 24, 1986,
which apparently follows the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Rocois Construction.
Although these two appellate court decisions are the most recent, and
highest, authority on the point, it seems quite clear that this particular
question will not be resolved finally until it receives the attention of the
Supreme Court of Canada.
IV. Charter of Rights
There is now, since the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
amendment (the Charter) to the Canadian Constitution 40 in 1982, a further
basis for constitutional challenge of the provisions of, and procedures
under, the Act. The Charter is effectively an entrenched bill of rights having
overriding effect on other legislation.
A. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Charter objections in recent cases are now so frequent it is impractical to
attempt to summarize here all the issues which potentially may be raised.
However, one illustration of its application in relation to the Act is provided
by Southam Inc. v. Director.4' On April 13, 1982, in the course of an inquiry
relating to the production, distribution and supply of newspapers in Edmon-
ton, Alberta, the Director authorized several Combines officers to exercise
his authority under the Act to enter and examine documents on the business
premises of the Edmonton Journal. On April 16, 1982, a member of the
RTPC issued a certificate under subsec. 10(3) of the Act which authorized
the exercise of the authority of the Director. The Combines officers spe-
cified in the Director's authorization entered the offices of the Journal and
commenced searching the premises. Shortly thereafter, Southam sought an
order restraining these officers from continuing their search. Southam took
the position that the provisions of the Act which conferred expansive powers
39. (1984) 47 O.R. (2d) 663 (Ontario High Court).
40. Charter of Rights, supra note 6.
41. (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 133 (Alberta Supreme Court); (1983), 147 D.L.R. (3d) 420
(Alberta Court of Appeal); and [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Supreme Court of Canada).
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of search and seizure on the Director offended sec. 8 of the Charter, which
provides that "everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search and seizure."
The trial judge found that while Southam had raised a serious question
under sec. 8 of the Charter, the balance of convenience was against granting
injunctive relief pending trial of the matter. However, a unanimous five-
judge panel of the Alberta Court of Appeal held the provisions to be
inconsistent with sec. 8, with the result that they were of no force and effect.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Dickson (now
Chief Justice), who rendered the decision on behalf of the Court, began by
observing that Canadian courts will have to interpret the Charter gener-
ously, so as to avoid "the austerity of tableted legalism," which he consid-
ered to be inappropriate to an analysis of constitutional documents. "The
task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of constru-
ing a statute." Observed Mr. Justice Dickson:
A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and easily
repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its
function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of
governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provi-
sions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of
growth and development over time to meet the new social, political and historical
realities often unimagined by its framers.4
2
Mr. Justice Dickson went on to endorse a broad, purposeful analysis of
the Charter, and clearly interpreted the specific provision in issue in these
proceedings in light of the Charter's larger objects. He held that the purpose
of the Charter is "to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason,
the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines," 43 and to constrain
governmental action which is inconsistent with those rights and freedoms.
As a result, in analyzing the intended effect of sec. 8 of the Charter he
considered that the courts must focus on the unreasonable impact of a search
on the individual involved, and not simply on the rationality of a statute
which authorizes a search or seizure in furtherance of some valid govern-
ment objective.
The issue before the Court revolved around a determination of the
meaning of the word "unreasonable." Ultimately Mr. Justice Dickson
found that this determination could only be made by balancing the respec-
tive rights of the individual to security from unwarranted invasions of
privacy against those of the state in advancing its goals of law enforcement.
This act of balancing has to occur prior to the execution of any powers of
42. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 165.
43. Id., at 166.
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search and seizure. As a result, a requirement of prior authorization has
been a consistent prerequisite to the valid exercise of such powers, both at
common law and under most statutes:
Such a requirement puts the onus on the state to demonstrate the superiority of its
interest to that of the individual. As such it accords with the apparent intention of
the Charter to prefer, where feasible, the right of the individual to be free from
state interference to the interests of the state in advancing its purposes through
such interference. 44
Having placed much emphasis on this process of balancing, Mr. Justice
Dickson went on to conclude that for an authorization of a search and
seizure to be meaningful, it is necessary for the person authorizing the
search to be entirely neutral and impartial. He held that while the indepen-
dent arbiter need not be a judge, he must, at the minimum, be capable of
acting judicially. The significant investigatory functions vested in the RTPC
under the Act, however, had the effect of "vitiating the ability" of one of its
members to act in a judicial capacity when authorizing a search and seizure
under subsec. 10(3) of the Act.
Mr. Justice Dickson went on to find that the search and seizure provisions
of the Act are also flawed in another material respect. Implicitly accepting
the finding of the Alberta Court of Appeal that, absent exceptional circum-
stances, the provisions of sec. 443 of the Criminal Code constitute the
minimal prerequisite for reasonable searches and seizures in connection
with the investigation of any criminal offense, Mr. Justice Dickson found
that sec. 10 of the Combines Investigation Act was woefully inadequate in
failing to set out the criteria which should be considered by an arbiter in
deciding whether or not to authorize a particular search and seizure:
Section 10 is terse in the extreme on the subject of criteria for issuing an authoriza-
tion for entry, search and seizure. Section 10(3) merely states that an RTPC
member may grant an authorization exparte. The only explicit criteria for granting
such an authorization are those mentioned in s. 10(1), namely: (1) that an inquiry
under the Act must be in progress; and (2) that the Director must believe that the
premises may contain relevant evidence. 46
The most obvious effect of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the
Southam case has been the removal from the Director of Investigation and
Research of his powers of search and seizure under the Act. However, the
federal Parliament will almost certainly rectify the problem caused by this
decision by amending the search and seizure provisions of the Act to answer
the concerns articulated by Mr. Justice Dickson in the course of his decision.
44. Id., at 160.
45. Id., at 164.
46. Id., at 165.
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Bill C-91, 47 which was introduced in December 1985, represents the
government's latest effort to amend the Combines Investigation Act. As a
consequence of the successful challenge, in Southam and other cases, of the
investigatory powers under the present Act, the Bill establishes an entirely
new framework for the exercise of investigatory powers. Under the Bill,
only a judge of a superior or country court or the federal court may issue a
search and seizure warrant on the application of the Director. In addition,
there will be a requirement that the judge have, prior to the issuance of the
warrant, reasonable grounds to believe that certain provisions of the Act
have been contravened, that an offense under the Act has been or is about to
be committed, or that other grounds for the making of an order by the
Competition Tribunal in respect of a restrictive trade practice exists, and
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is evidence on the
premises in question relating to such contravention, offense or other
grounds. The Bill also requires that any seized materials be taken before the
judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court in order
that he may determine whether or not the seized materials have been
retained by the Director for the purposes of conducting an inquiry or
proceedings under the Act.48
The provisions of the Bill are not yet law and in the meantime Combines
officials have been relying upon the investigatory powers contained in the
Criminal Code.49 Subsec. 27(2) of the federal Interpretation Act50 provides
that all of the provisions of the Criminal Code which relate to indictable
offenses apply to all other indictable offenses created by a federal enact-
ment, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise provides. Following
the decisions of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Southam, and of the Federal
Court-Trial Division in Thomson Newspapers Limited et al. v. Lawson A.
W. Hunter et al. ,5 the Combines investigators began utilizing sec. 443 of the
Code to obtain authorizations for searches and seizures in respect of
offenses allegedly committed against the Act. The Combines investigators
took the position that the search and seizure provisions in the Act were of
such questionable constitutional validity that they had no choice but to
utilize sec. 443 of the Code in order validly to execute searches and seizures.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Southam, at least one lower court
47. Supra note 7.
48. For a fuller discussion of the effects of the Southam case see: Goldman, Hunter v.
Southam: The Decision and Its Effects, CAN. COMPET. POL. REC., 1 (Dec. 1984); and Thomson,
Limiting the Search and Seizure Powers of Combines Investigators: The Southam Decision and
Its Aftermath, 1985 CAN. Bus. LAW J. 55.
49. Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C. 1970, c.34, s.443.
50. Interpretation Act (Canada) R.S.C. 1970 c.1-23.
51. (1983), 73 C.P.R. (2d) 67 (Federal Court-Trial Division).
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proceeding52 challenged the propriety of the Combines investigators using
the search and seizure provisions of the Code. The applicants claimed that
sec. 10 of the Combines Investigation Act constitutes an exhaustive code of
procedure governing the execution of searches and seizures of documents
on premises in respect of offenses committed against the Act, and is there-
fore a "provision otherwise" within the meaning of subsec. 27(2) of the
Interpretation Act. The court held that the search and seizure provisions of
the Act were of no force and effect and that they contravened sec. 8 of the
Charter and as a consequence further held that these provisions were not
"provisions otherwise," with the result that the Combines investigators
could validly make use of sec. 443 of the Code. This decision was subse-
quently upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal.
As a consequence, pending the enactment of Bill C-91, all searches and
seizures executed by Combines investigators with respect to alleged offenses
against the Act are proceeding pursuant to sec. 443 of the Criminal Code. In
this regard it should be noted that under sec. 10 of the Act the Director could
seek authorization for searches and seizures in connection with any inquiry
under the Act. Inquiries under the Act can be commenced both with respect
to offenses allegedly committed against the Act, and with respect to the
reviewable trade practices set out in Part IV. 1 of the Act. Under sec. 443 of
the Code, however, the Director is only able to proceed with searches in
connection with alleged criminal offenses. The practical effect of Southam,
then, has been to curtail the powers of search and seizure available to the
Director with respect to reviewable trade practices (refusal to deal, exclu-
sive dealing, tied selling, etc.). Also, the evidentiary threshold which must
be met in order to obtain a warrant under sec. 443 of the Code is much
higher, meaning that fewer warrants will be granted. Any warrants which
are granted with respect to Combines offenses will be more vulnerable to
attack for failure to comply with the particular requirements under sec. 443.
At present, there is no definitive Canadian judicial determination as to
whether sec. 8 of the Charter can be invoked to attack the provisions in the
Act which provide for the compulsory production of documents. Subsec.
17(1) of the Act authorizes a member of the RTPC to require any person
present in Canada to "make production of books, papers, records or other
documents." It is clear that no independent arbiter is required to make a
prior assessment of the reasonableness or relevance of the material sought.
The member of the Commission who issues the order is authorized, by
virtue of subsec. 17(1), to make "such orders as seem to him to be proper"
52. Miles Laboratories v. Hunter (Supreme Court of Ontario, Toronto Motions Court; Mr.
Justice Galligan: reasons dated June 1, 1984; appeal dismissed by Ontario Court of Appeal,
Oct. 1, 984).
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for securing the production ordered. He is empowered, in so doing, to
exercise all of the powers that are exercised by any superior court in Canada
for the enforcement of subpoenas, including the power to cite for contempt.
Much of the uncertainty in this area emanates from the difficulty of
determining whether compulsory production of documents constitutes a
"seizure" within the meaning of sec. 8. In Re Zeigler and Hunter, 3 the
Federal Court of Appeal clearly adopted the position that sec. 8 of the
Charter does not apply to the production of documents. Much of the Court's
reasoning was premised on the finding that an order under subsec. 17(1) of
the Act does not involve either an uninvited entry or a forcible seizure of
documents.
The Alberta Court of Appeal differed from the position adopted by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Zeigler, in Re Alberta Human Rights Commis-
sion and Alberta Blue Cross Plan.54 In that case, the court considered the
legitimacy of a request for records belonging to an employer in connection
with a preliminary investigation into a sex discrimination complaint. Be-
cause the allegations in this case involved only civil sanctions, the court held
that the demand for production was reasonable, and therefore valid. Never-
theless, the court clearly indicated that sec. 8 of the Charter could be
invoked successfully in an appropriate case to oppose a demand for produc-
tion of documents.
Thus, no definitive statement can be made as to the state of the law in this
area, until the issue is finally decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.
B. TRIAL BY JURY
It has been held, in PPG Industries Canada Ltd. and A-G Canada,55 that
the right to trial by jury conferred by subsec. 11(f) of the Charter 56 is
unavailable to a corporate accused in a prosecution under the Act because a
corporation is not liable to imprisonment, although an individual accused
who committed such an offense would be.
C. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Subsec. 11(d) of the Charter enshrines the "golden rule" cited by the
House of Lords in the Woolmington case,57 that a person charged with an
53. (1983), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 648 (Fed. C.A.) (leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada
refused).
54. (1983), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 301.
55. (1983) 3 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (B.C. Supreme Court).
56. This subsec. applies where the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or
more.
57. Woolmington v. D.P.P. [1935] A.C. 462, 481 (House of Lords).
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offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according
to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.
Clause 45(2)(c)(ii) of the Combines Investigation Act stipulates that, in
any prosecution or proceeding before a court or under the Act, a document
proved to be in the possession of a "participant" to the proceedings, or on
premises used or occupied by a participant or his agent, is prima facie proof
that anything recorded in or by the document as having been done, said or
agreed upon by the participant, was done, said or agreed upon "as re-
corded." The accused in R. v. Metropolitan Toronto Pharmacists Associa-
tion (No. 1)58 unsuccessfully argued that this provision violated the
aforementioned presumption of innocence guaranteed by subsec. 11(d) of
the Charter.
V. Competition Law Reform
On December 17, 1985, the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs
introduced Bill C-9159 into the Canadian House of Commons for first
reading. In many ways it is very similar in content to its immediate predeces-
sor (Bill C-29)60 which was introduced in April 1984, but not proceeded
with. Like its predecessors, Bill C-91 proposes major reforms in competi-
tion legislation.
The introduction of Bill C-91 follows an extensive period of consultation
with a number of influential Canadian business organizations. As a conse-
quence it is expected that the legislation will, in due course, secure approval
in that its main content is generally regarded as being satisfactory and
unlikely to provoke significant opposition. That is not to say that the
business community is in agreement with all aspects of the Bill, but it is
recognized as being a reasonable compromise document and deserving of
support on that basis, particularly after so much time has elapsed since the
initial efforts to initiate these reforms began. The business community has
expressed particular objections to certain aspects of the merger and
monopoly provisions as well as to the decision to transfer the civil jurisdic-
tions to a specialized economic tribunal. Nevertheless, the government,
having heard these objections, is determined to proceed on the basis set
forth in the Bill and commands a very substantial majority in Parliament.
Space does not permit a very extended description of the provisions of the
Bill but some brief mention of the more important provisions may be useful.
In addition, it may be helpful to point out certain differences in the present
Bill from its predecessor. In this latter regard, mention should be made of
58. (1984) 3 C.P.R. (3d) 233 (Ontario High Court).
59. See supra note 7.
60. See supra note 8.
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the fact that in yet another reversal of position on this issue, the government
has decided in favor of proceeding with a specialized tribunal, rather than
the courts, for the exercise of all of the civil jurisdictions provided under the
Act. The present Bill also contains extensive provisions establishing a new
code of investigative procedures to replace sec. 10 of the Act which was
impugned in the South am case.
An important new theme which runs throughout the Bill is the recognition
of the overall importance of international trade and competition to the
Canadian economy. Under the Bill the export exemption to the conspiracy
offense is broadened to enable Canadian firms to compete more effectively
in the international marketplace and a new exemption is created to facilitate
the formation of specialized agreements enabling Canadian firms to
rationalize production in response to foreign competition. Also the new
merger test proposed in the Bill takes specific account of the existence of, or
potential for, competition from foreign imports in assessing the effect of a
proposed merger on competition in Canada.
A. CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
Bill C-91 retains the distinction between criminal offenses and competi-
tion matters to be reviewed according to a civil standard. While the Bill
proposes that the current criminal provisions relating to mergers and mo-
nopolies be repealed and replaced with entirely new civil law provisions
dealing with mergers and abuse of dominant position, it also provides that
agreements in restraint of trade are to continue to be decided according to a
criminal law standard.
B. CONSPIRACY
The Bill attempts to legislate away certain uncertainties thought to have
been created in several recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. In
one such instance, in the Atlantic Sugar6 1 case, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that consciously parallel condui-t by certain sugar producers
which diminished competition was beyond-the purview of the conspiracy
provisions of the current Act, because this conduct lacked the necessary
element of overt communication. To remedy this, the proposed clarifying
amendment provides that an agreement or conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, with or without evidence of communication.
The majority decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in both the
61. Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd. v. A-G Can., [19801-2 S.C.R. 644 (Supreme Court of
Canada).
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Atlantic Sugar and Aetna Insurance62 cases are thought by some to suggest
that there may be an obligation on the Crown in a conspiracy case to prove
that the accused had both the intent to enter into an agreement which has an
undue effect on competition, and also the intent that the agreement should
have this effect. A further amending provision in the Bill establishes that
there is no need to prove the latter intent.
In addition the Bill proposes increasing the limit on fines for violations of
sec. 32 from the current maximum of $1 million to $5 million.
C. EXPORT AGREEMENTS
Subsec. 32(4) of the Act provides for an exemption, in certain limited
circumstances, from the conspiracy provisions, where the "conspiracy, com-
bination, agreement or arrangement relates only to the export of products
from Canada." Many Canadian firms and trade associations have been
concerned about relying on this provision since the exemption appears to be
conditioned on, among other things, the agreement not having lessened
competition unduly in the domestic market. In response to complaints that
the exemption is for such reason of limited practical utility, the Bill, by
proposing certain amendments, attempts to make the export exemption
more useful to Canadian firms which combine efforts in an attempt to
expand into foreign markets. Accordingly, the present limitation is to be
replaced by a less stringent requirement that the agreement must not have
lessened competition unduly in the supply of services facilitating the export
of products from Canada. The Bill would also permit parties to an export
agreement to reduce the volume of exports of certain products if there is no
reduction in the real value of these products, suggesting that product quality
may be upgraded as a trade-off for a reduction in unit export sales.
D. CIVIL PROVISIONs-REvIEWABLE BY TRIBUNAL
Under the Bill, civil adjudication of the majority of significant competi-
tion policy issues, such as mergers, abuse of dominant market position,
delivered pricing and the present reviewable trade practices, would be
governed by the proposed Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal). Following
the consultative process described above, the Government decided that a
hybrid tribunal composed of both judges and expert laypersons would be the
most appropriate adjudicative forum to review competition matters. To this
end the Bill provides for the creation of the Tribunal comprised of up to four
judicial and up to eight laymembers. The judicial members, to be appointed
from among the judges of the Federal Court-Trial Division, will have sole
62. Aetna Insurance Co. and 72 Other Companies v. The Queen [1978] 1 S.C.R. 731
(Supreme Court of Canada).
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responsibility with respect to determining questions of law arising before the
Tribunal. Laymembers of the panel will be restricted to considering ques-
tions of fact or mixed law and fact. With limited exceptions, all applications
to the Tribunal are to be heard by a panel of at least three and not more than
five persons, including both judicial and laymembers. The Bill provides that
appeals from decisions of the Tribunal are to be heard by the Federal Court
of Appeal.
E. MERGERS
The existing merger provisions of the Act have been widely criticized as
being ineffective. It is also argued that by providing for criminal sanctions,
these provisions cast an inappropriate stigma on business transactions.
Many are of the view that the existing merger provisions are inappropriate in
circumstances where courts must often analyze complex economic issues in
order to determine the legality of a merger. Furthermore the judiciary, by
failing to consider larger issues of public policy, has concentrated on rel-
atively narrow criteria, such as profits and prices, in determining the legality
of mergers.
Bill C-91 incorporates an entirely new set of provisions, making mergers a
civil matter reviewable by the Tribunal on application by the Director.
While at the present time a merger only offends the Act when, as a result of
the merger, competition is or is likely to be lessened to the detriment or
against the interests of the public, the Bill provides that the courts may
review a merger when it prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen,
competition substantially.
In administering the new statutory test, the Tribunal will not be permitted
to find that a merger substantially lessens competition solely on the basis of
evidence of market share or concentration levels. This is designed to ensure
that the Tribunal's consideration is more than a merely mechanistic process
and that it focuses on both the quantitative and qualitative effects of the
merger on competition. Factors set forth in the Bill which the Tribunal is
directed to consider include: the extent to which foreign products provide
competition to the businesses of the parties to the merger; whether the
business (in whole or in part) of one of the parties to the merger has failed or
is likely to fail; the extent to which acceptable substitutes are likely to be
available; the barriers to entry in the relevant market and the impact of the
merger on such barriers; the extent to which effective competition will
remain in the market; and any other factor thought to be relevant to
competition in the market affected by the proposed merger.
The Bill incorporates an "efficiency gains exception," whereby the Tri-
bunal may exempt a merger if a finding is made that the merger or proposed
merger has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that
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will result in a substantial real net saving of resources for the Canadian
economy and that such gains could not reasonably be expected to be
attained if the exemption order were not made.
The current merger laws have been subject to the criticism that, in the
case of extremely large mergers, very little can be done to dissolve such
mergers after they have been completed. The Bill responds to this criticism
by stipulating that parties to a merger which exceeds certain relatively high
thresholds must notify the Director before the merger is completed and
must file certain prescribed information with respect to the transaction in
question.
F. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
The Bill proposes replacing the criminal provisions of the Act relating to
monopolies with provisions which make an "abuse of dominant position" a
civil matter reviewable by the Tribunal. Under the Bill, before a court can
issue an order prohibiting an abuse of dominant position, it must find that
the person or persons against whom the order is sought substantially or
completely control, throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or
species of business. The Tribunal must also find that such persons have
engaged in or are engaging in a practice of "anti-competitive acts" that has
had or is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition
substantially in a market. Where the Tribunal finds that there is an abuse of
dominant position, it may prohibit all or any of the persons involved from
engaging in the practice. Where such an order of prohibition would not
restore competition, the Tribunal may, in addition to or in lieu of making a
prohibition order, require the taking of such actions, including the divesti-
ture of assets or shares, as it considers reasonable and necessary to over-
come the effects of the practice in the market.
Two important exceptions are provided for in the Bill. Where the person
against whom the order is sought has achieved its dominant position by
virtue of superior economic efficiency, no order may be made. Further-
more, where an act is engaged in pursuant only to the exercise of any right or
enjoyment of any interest derived under the Copyright Act, Industrial
Design Act, Patent Act, Trade Marks Act, or any other Act of the Parlia-
ment of Canada, no order may be made.
G. DELIVERED PRICING
The Bill provides for orders of prohibition to be issued in regard to the
practice of "delivered pricing." That term is defined as the practice of
refusing to deliver to a customer, or a prospective customer, an article at any
locality on the same terms and conditions as are made available to other
customers of the supplier. Where the practice is engaged in by a major
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supplier or where the practice is widespread in a market with the result that a
customer is denied an advantage which would otherwise be available to him,
the Bill provides that an order of prohibition may be issued.
H. SPECIALIZATION AGREEMENTS
Another new function that, under the Bill, would be given over to the
Tribunal is that of exempting certain specialization agreements from the
purview of the conspiracy and exclusive dealing provisions of the Act.
A "specialization agreement" is defined in the Bill as a mutually recipro-
cal arrangement among the parties to the agreement whereby each agrees to
discontinue the production of one or more articles then being produced by
that party. The Bill provides for the Tribunal to order the registration of
specialization agreements in appropriate cases. Where it so orders, the Bill
provides for the exemption of the agreement from the conspiracy and
exclusive dealing provisions of the Act. The Tribunal is to make such an
order where, in its view, implementation of the agreement would result in
substantial real net savings for the Canadian economy not otherwise avail-
able, and where there has been no attempt to coerce participation in the
agreement. Where, as a consequence of granting such an exemption, there
would not be any substantial remaining competition in the relevant market,
the Tribunal would be authorized to make its order conditional upon divesti-
ture of assets, tariff reductions, duty remission orders, wider patent licens-
ing or removal of import quotas or licensing requirements.
I. EXTENDED APPLICATION OF THE ACT
The Bill extends the application of the Act by expanding its effect to
banks, and by making certain Crown corporations subject to its purview.
1. Banks
The Bill proposes the incorporation into the Act of the corresponding
horizontal agreement provisions presently found in the Bank Act.63 This
amendment would necessarily involve the transfer of responsibility for the
enforcement of such provisions to the Director from the Inspector General
of Banks. Many of the provisions, which relate to such matters as agree-
ments among banks with respect to interest rates, service charges and the
types of loans or services to be provided to customers, createperse offenses.
Part of the rationale for this transfer of jurisdiction over the competitive
activities of banks is undoubtedly the fact that banks compete with other
financial institutions which are already governed by the Act.
63. S.C. c.40.
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2. Crown Corporations
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Regina v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd.,64
held that two federal Crown corporations, which were among those charged
in 1981 under sec. 32 of the Act in connection with an alleged uranium
cartel, were immune from prosecution under the Act because the acts in
question were committed by them as Crown agents and were designed to
effect Crown purposes.
To redress this situation the Bill imposes limits on the special privilege of
Crown immunity accorded to federal or provincial Crown corporations




The conspiracy provisions of the Act have traditionally been the most
effective enforcement remedy in the legislation. Accordingly, it is somewhat
paradoxical that, as a result of a number of recent cases, this law is now
claimed to be seriously defective from an enforcement point of view.
Two fairly recent and frequently cited decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in support of this view are the Aetna Insurance and Atlantic Sugar
cases cited above. In Aetna, an association of insurance companies in Nova
Scotia established a common price or rate structure for fire insurance
premiums in the province during a ten year period, between 1960 and 1970.
During that period, the total share of fire insurance policies in Nova Scotia
written by members of the association ranged from 63 percent to 81.5
percent. The various defendants admitted the existence of an agreement
which restricted competition. As a result, the sole issue to be determined by
the Supreme Court of Canada in this case related to the meaning of the word
"undue" in para. 32(1)(c) of the Act.
Mr. Justice Ritchie, speaking for the majority, held that the mere inten-
tion between the parties to the agreement to eliminate all competition as
between themselves, could not be considered a contravention of the Act. He
then quoted with approval the statement of Mr. Justice Cartwright in
Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v. The Queen,6 5 to the effect that an
agreement to prevent or lessen competition in commercial activities be-
comes criminal when the prevention or lessening agreed upon reaches the
point at which the participants in the agreement become free to carry on
those activities virtually unaffected by the influence of competition.
In the Atlantic Sugar case, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
64. [1983] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Supreme Court of Canada).
65. [19571 S.C.R. 403, 426 (Supreme Court of Canada).
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whether a "tacit agreement" between the three principal refiners of sugar in
eastern Canada not to compete beyond the maintenance of historical mar-
ket shares constituted a violation of sec. 32 of the Act. In 1960, one of these
refiners, Redpath, having been severely hurt by a price war which it initiated
in 1958, adopted a long-term marketing strategy under which it concen-
trated on maintaining its historical market share. While Redpath would
engage in selective discounting, particularly with respect to its largest cus-
tomers, it would only attempt to maintain its share of the market in accord-
ance with historical norms. In so doing, Redpath recognized that over the
course of time both of its major competitors would appreciate that this was
the course of action which Redpath was consciously following. Furthermore
Redpath realized that its competitors would probably adopt similar courses
of action.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Pigeon decided that the intention
of Redpath to maintain its historical market share and not to compete
beyond that level, and the eventual acceptance of this approach by the other
two refiners as an overall principle of operating conduct (which he described
as a "tacit agreement"), did not constitute a conspiracy or agreement for the
purposes of sec. 32 because it lacked the necessary element of overt com-
munication to the other parties. The mere fact that Redpath's policy became
known to the others over time was insufficient to constitute an agreement or
arrangement even if, as expected, the competitors adopted a similar
approach when they became aware of it. Mr. Justice Pigeon concluded by
observing that none of the competitors was obliged to compete more
strongly than it considered desirable in its own interest provided that this
was not accomplished by collusion.
In both the Aetna Insurance and Atlantic Sugar cases there were state-
ments which may be interpreted as requiring findings of fact not only that the
accused intended to do the acts which are forbidden by the statute because
of their undue effect on competition, but also that they intended that their
acts should have such effect. It should be noted that in the later Thomson
Newspapers case,66 the suggestion that either of the Aetna or Atlantic Sugar
cases established a requirement for proving "double intent" (i.e., to commit
the act with the intended anti-competitive consequences) was expressly
denied by Mr. Justice Anderson.
Two other recent cases of interest relating to sec. 32 may be mentioned. In
Albany Felt Co. of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen 67 the Quebec appellate court
upheld the conviction of accused corporations, all of whom were members
of a trade association which supplied in excess of 90 percent of all papermak-
ers wet felts sold in Canada during the indictment period, who conspired to
66. Ontario High Court Dec. 1983 (unreported).
67. (1983), 70 C.P.R. (2d) 36 (Quebec Court of Appeal).
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limit competition in their business. The conviction was essentially the result
of circumstantial evidence. During the twenty-two year period covered by
the charges (1952-1974), all the price lists of all the competitors in this
industry were identical or substantially identical. The trial judge clearly
considered that the identicality of pricing must have come about as a
consequence of agreement achieved through the representatives of the
accused while attending meetings of the Canadian Felt Association,
although there does not appear to have been any direct evidence of this:
The foregoing does not of itself establish beyond a reasonable doubt that collusion
among the accused occurred in setting the prices concerned. Mere followership is
not an offence. However, in nearly every instance such identity of price structure
coupled with the fact that the representatives of the accused were meeting on a
regular basis, that in most but not all, of the issuances of new lists they were
proclaimed within a short period of time, may not help but raise serious questions
in the minds of the Court. 68
It appears the Judge was influenced by the fact that the customers of the
accused corporations had made concerted efforts to procure quantity dis-
counts and to break up lock-step price increases but had met, as he put it, "a
solid wall of stone." 69
In the second recent case, Attorney General of Canada v. the Law Society
of British Columbia et al. ,7 a preliminary question arose as to whether the
Act applied to the Law Society of British Columbia. The case involved a
ruling by the Benchers of the Law Society prohibiting a Vancouver lawyer
from informing the public regarding the type and costs of legal services
which he provided. In one of the ensuing proceedings the question arose as
to whether in so doing the Benchers may have violated sec. 32 of the Act.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Law Society was exempt from the
application of this section. Under its governing legislation the Benchers of
the Law Society were directed to "govern and administer the affairs of the
Society... (and to take) such action... as they may consider necessary for
the promotion, protection, interest or welfare of the Society." 71 The legisla-
tion also empowered the Benchers to make such rules concerning the
maintenance of the Society standards for the protection and well-being of
those engaged in the practice of law in the province. The Court considered
the actions of the Benchers to have been within the authority of the enabling
legislation and that in the circumstances self-regulation to have been most
appropriate.
In a very recent decision, in R. v. Mediacom Industries Inc.,7z the accused
68. (1981) 52 C.P.R. (2d) 190 (Quebec Superior Court, Trial Division) per Mr. Justice
Phelan, at 194.
69. Id., at 198.
70. (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (Supreme Court of Canada).
71. Id., at 6.
72. (1985) 3 C.P.R. (3d) 47 (Ontario High Court).
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(who pleaded guilty to an unlawful conspiracy charge under sec. 32) re-
ceived the highest fines ever upheld in a horizontal agreement case, the
largest individual fine imposed being $400 thousand.
B. MONOPOLY
There have been only two reported decisions since 1980 under the
monopoly provisions contained in sec. 33 of the Act and only one of these
dealt with substantive issues. The monopoly provisions are infrequently
invoked because of the inherent difficulties which have been encountered in
establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the accused substan-
tially or completely controls throughout an area of Canada the class of
business in which it is engaged, but also that such business has been, or is
likely to be, operated to the detriment of the public.
In R. v. Thomson Newspapers,7 3 Mr. Justice Anderson of the Ontario
Supreme Court acquitted the Thomson and Southam newspaper chains on a
series of charges under the Act. The principal events which precipitated the
prosecution began with the closure of the Montreal Star by F. P. Publica-
tions Ltd. in September 1979. Subsequently, Southam's Montreal Gazette
acquired and then exercised an option to purchase the printing presses
owned by the Star. In return, F. P. Publications Ltd. obtained an option to
acquire one-third of the shares of the Gazette. In January of 1980, Thomson
acquired F. P. Publications Ltd. and subsequently exercised the aforemen-
tioned option to purchase a one-third interest in the Gazette. On August 26,
1980, Thomson closed the Ottawa Journal, with the result that the only
remaining newspaper in the city of Ottawa was Southam's Citizen. The
following day, Southam closed the Winnipeg Tribune, and sold its physical
assets and name to Thomson. The only remaining newspaper in Winnipeg
was Thomson's Free Press. Thomson also sold its fifty percent interest in
Pacific Press Ltd. to Southam, with the result that Southam acquired full
ownership of the Vancouver Sun and Province newspapers. Thomson also
sold back F. P. Publications Ltd.'s one-third interest in the Montreal Gazette
to Southam.
Two of the charges related specifically to the formation of a monopoly in
Montreal and Winnipeg. Both of these charges were dismissed. Mr. Justice
Anderson rejected the contention of the Crown that the Court should
consider the situation which prevailed in the newspaper markets in Mon-
treal and Winnipeg before the formation of the monopolies, in determining
whether the monopolists had operated their businesses to the detriment or
against the interests of the public. He next proceeded to consider the criteria
which must be dealt with in determining whether sufficient "public detri-
73. Ontario High Court, Dec. 1983 (unreported).
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ment" exists to merit conviction under the Act:
The framing of the offence of monopoly in the Act tacitly acknowledges that there
may be monopoly without detriment. Proof of detriment must therefore, go
beyond the consequences which flow purely and simply from the fact of monopoly,
to some abuse in its operation. The Crown did not submit that Southam had
abused or was abusing the monopoly; in other words, there was no evidence of
present detriment ... It was suggested that there was a likelihood, once this case
was over, and its repercussions had, to some extent died away, that that situation
might change, was likely to change, and that abuse of monopoly would result.
Having regard for the definition of 'likely' which is used in the Act, and an
alternative being 'probable,' I am not prepared to accept that submission. I think it
equally likely that having gone this way once, Southam may very well be per-
suaded that it does not wish to come this way a second time. So that there




One anomaly in regard to the Act is the complete absence of jurispru-
dence on the subject of price discrimination. Although this continues to be
the case, the recent conviction of a bedroom furniture manufacturer under
para. 34(1)(a) on a plea of guilty is to some degree instructive of the
government's enforcement attitude in regard to incentive discounts and
volume rebates. 75 These counts of the charge are effectively described in the
Agreed Statement of Facts which was filed in the case. Simmons was fined
$15 thousand per count on two counts of price discrimination.
Count 1 related to conditional incentive rebates. It would appear that the
Simmons program was a classic example of the sort of incentive discount
plan which has generally been regarded as offensive to para. 34(1)(a). In this
regard it is to be noted that in the Agreed Statement of Facts it is stated:
This conditional incentive rebate plan resulted in price discrimination because the
discounts granted were not directly related to the quantity purchased by a dealer
but rather to the increase in purchases during the year as compared to purchases
made during the previous year.76
The second price discrimination count related to Simmons' volume rebate
program which is also described in the Agreed Statement:
The structure of the plan led to multiple instances of discriminatory rebates being
granted by Simmons. The structural features of the plan which contributed to
discrimination are:
(a) the initial starting volume brackets varied widely between competitors;
(b) the range of the volume brackets was inconsistent between competing dealers
74. Id.
75. R. v. Simmons Limited (Provincial Court [Criminal Division] Judicial District of Peel)
Agreed Statement of Facts (unreported). The text of the order in this case appears at ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 21, at 139-141.
76. Id.
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such that the incremental purchases required to reach a higher rebate bracket
varied between dealers;
(c) for other than the first rebate level, a different percentage rebate was appli-
cable to each of the separate categories of Bedding, Upholstered Goods and
Case Goods; and
(d) although generally consistent between competing dealers, the percentage
applicable to a category at any given rebate level occasionally varied between
competitors.
This case is not really a legal authority since it resulted from a plea of guilty
entered on behalf of the accused. However, it would seem to be an indica-
tion of the enforcement attitude of the Bureau of Competition Policy in
regard to such practices.
D. PREDATORY PRICING
Para. 34(1)(c) of the Act prohibits persons engaged in a business from
"engaging in a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low, having
the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a
competitor, or designed to have such effect." In Regina v. Hoffmann-
LaRoche Ltd.7 8 the charges arose out of the policy of the accused in selling
its "Librium" and "Valium" products to hospitals in Canada. During the
late 1960s, a change in the law respecting the compulsory licensing of drug
products opened the way for a potentially significant competitor, Horner, to
market a generically equivalent product. The accused's response was to
initiate a program of distributing "free goods" to hospitals and government
agencies. Hoffmann-LaRoche ultimately offered, over a one year period,
to provide to the hospitals all their requirements for Valium free of charge.
This action was effective in preventing the competitor from making any
significant inroads on sales to hospitals.
The accused contended that it had not violated the Act because it had not
made any "sales" of its products to the hospitals. An alternative argument
was that even if these products could be said to have been sold at zero price,
in the circumstances it was not unreasonable to sell at below cost if such sales
gave rise to other economic benefits (such as promoting the prescription of
these drugs by doctors on the basis of their acceptance by the hospitals).
The Court had no difficulty in characterizing the free goods distribution as
an integral part of Hoffmann-LaRoche's sales policy. The distribution of
Valium to hospitals was intended to have the long-term effect of generating
future sales after the elimination of a competitor. It was motivated exclu-
sively by the objective of maximizing long-term profits, and "thus there was
a selling going on at a zero price." It had been contended that the actions of
the accused constituted simply a competitive response. However, the one
77. Id.
78. (1982), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 607 (Ontario Court of Appeal).
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year giveaway of Valium was not regarded as simply a matter of competitive
response or defense of the accused's market share. The accused might have
been justified in counter attacking to meet, and perhaps even better,
Horner's prices, but to reduce its prices to zero was overdoing it. In the
result, Hoffmann-LaRoche was convicted and the conviction was upheld on
appeal.
In another case, R. v. Consumers Glass Co. Ltd. ,9 Consumers Glass and
one of its subsidiaries, Portion Packaging Ltd., were charged with respect to
the sales policy of the subsidiary relating to plastic container lids. During the
preindictment period, Portion Packaging had been the sole supplier of
plastic lids to the Canadian market. Even at that time it had excess capacity.
Then some former employees left to form a competitive firm, Amhil. Both
Portion and Amhil had virtually identical production machinery, both had
the necessary capacity to supply the entire requirements of the Canadian
market, and both used virtually identical manufacturing methods. Amhil
entered the market offering prices 2 percent to 3 percent below Portion's.
Portion responded with a 16 percent discount which was met by Amhil. This
brought Portion's selling price well below its total cost of manufacturing.
Ultimately, Portion was forced out of the market in 1979. Ironically,
Portion was subsequently charged under para. 34(1)(c) of the Act. It was
alleged that the decision to lower the prices to a figure below the Company's
production cost was made for the purpose and with the intent of forcing its
competitor out of the market.
Mr. Justice O'Leary of the Ontario Supreme Court held that there was no
evidence that in pricing its products, the accused was not simply minimizing
its losses by maximizing its throughput. The Court accepted the contention
of the accused's expert witnesses to the effect that, so long as products are
sold at or above their average variable cost, it could not be said that the
motive of the accused was necessarily predatory, even though the accused
could probably be taken to have recognized that ultimately this could lead to
the elimination of its competitor. Mr. Justice O'Leary observed that since
both companies maintained plant capacity sufficient to supply the require-
ments of the entire Canadian market, it was inevitable that one of them
would have to drop out if either of them were to make a profit in the
business.
E. ADVERTISING ALLOWANCES
Although sec. 35 of the Act, dealing with advertising or promotional
allowances, has been on the statute books for many years and is difficult to
comply with, it has not been extensively enforced and until the recent case of
79. (1981), 57 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (Ontario High Court).
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Regina v. Koss Ltd. (Provincial Court, British Columbia) 80 there had never
been a conviction under this section in a contested case. Under this section,
generally speaking, an advertising allowance is required to be offered by a
supplier on proportionate terms to all competing purchasers from that
supplier if such benefits are to be conferred upon any of its customers. In this
case the accused was convicted of violating the section in connection with
the selective application of its cooperative advertising program to particular
purchasers when that program was not available to its other competing
customers. The violation of the statute appears to have been particularly
blatant in that while the evidence showed that the cooperative advertising
program had been extended to large stores such as Eaton's, Simpsons and
Woodwards, the accused had written to various other smaller retail vendors
of its products denying that it had a cooperative advertising program.
F. PRICE MAINTENANCE
Amendments made to the price maintenance provisions contained in sec.
38 of the Act in 1976 have clearly facilitated the obtaining of convictions
under the revised section. However, an important limitation on the scope of
sec. 38 was established in R. v. Philips Electronics Ltd.s ' In that case Philips
published an advertisement in Ottawa and Toronto newspapers listing the
stores where, and the prices at which, Philips television converters could be
purchased. On these facts, the accused was charged with two counts of
attempting to influence upward the selling price of the converters, contrary
to para. 38(1)(a) of the Act. It was argued that these advertisements con-
travened the Act since subsec. 38(4) deems the publication of a purchase
price to be an attempt to influence upward the selling price of any person
into whose hands the product comes for resale unless the advertisement
makes it clear that the product may be sold at a lower price (which was not
done in this case). It was held by the Ontario Court of Appeal (which
holding was subsequently upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court of Cana-
da) that, in order to convict under this section, it is required to prove not
only such an attempt but also that the attempt was accompanied by an
agreement, threat, promise or other like means. Of this there was no
evidence, beyond the publication by the accused of the advertisements
showing the prices. The Court rejected the contention of the Crown that this
publication constituted "like means," since it was in no way similar to an
agreement, threat or promise. Essentially the court pointed out that the
particular section had been defectively drafted and went on to observe that it
was not open to the courts, by resorting to the remedial intent provisions of
80. (1982), 65 C.P.R. (2d) 95 (Provincial Court, British Columbia).
81. (1981), 30 O.R. (2d) 129 (Ont. C.A.); (1981) 126 D.L.R. (3d) 767 (Supreme Court of
Canada).
WINTER 1986
114 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the Interpretation Act to provide a substitute for the clear meaning of the
provision as set forth in the enactment itself.
In Regina v. Cluett Peabody Canada Inc.82 the accused was convicted of
two charges, one of attempting, by agreement, threat, promise or other like
means, to influence upwards or discourage the reduction of resale prices and
the other related to a refusal to supply products to a would-be retailer of
those products, because of its low pricing policy. In regard to the first-
mentioned offense there was evidence that the accused had obtained the
agreement of a retailer, who was engaged in newspaper advertising featur-
ing the accused's products at special sale prices, not to identify the manufac-
turer of such sale-price product. This the Court held to constitute a dis-
couragement of price reductions in the market area in question. In regard to
the refusal to supply charge, the Court obtained a rather unusual insight into
the accused's possible motivation in refusing to open up the would-be
account, in that a telephone message from the local sales representative was
produced in evidence indicating that the sales representative was seeking
some reason he could give to the would-be account for refusing to supply it,
other than the fact that the account was a known discounter.
There are now two instances in which subsec. 38(6) has been applied to
convict persons who induced suppliers not to supply a product to a third
person because of that third person's low pricing policy. Ultimately, this
may be an important development in the enforcement of the price mainte-
nance laws since it is frequently the case that price maintenance practiced by
a supplier is customer-induced.
In Regina v. S. & E. Furnishings Limited83 the accused pleaded guilty to
an offense under subsec. 38(6) of the Act which provides that it is an offense
for any person by threat, promise or any like means to attempt to induce a
supplier, as a condition of that person's doing business with the supplier, to
refuse to supply a product to a particular person because of the low pricing
policy of that person.
In Regina v. Cody Food Equipment Ltd.84 the accused, a restaurant
equipment dealer-installer, was convicted and fined $9 thousand for threat-
ening a supplier of refrigeration equipment with the discontinuance of their
business relationship if the supplier sold a refrigerator to a competitor of the
accused who was bidding on the same contract, but at a lower price. The
supplier in fact did not supply the unit to the competitor and the accused's
bid was successful.
82. (1982), 64 C.P.R. (2d) (Ontario Supreme Court); (1983) 71 C.P.R. (2d) 208 (Ontario
Court of Appeal).
83. (July 8, 1982), Ontario Provincial Court, Sudbury, Ontario (unreported), as discussed in
CAN. COMPET. POL. REC., 3-4 (Dec. 1982).
84. (1984), Ontario Provincial Court (unreported), as discussed in CAN. COMPET. POL. REC.,
21 (Sept. 1983).
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In another case of interest, Regina v. Schelew,85 the accused was charged
with an offense of attempting to influence upward the price at which mem-
bers of a landlords association supplied rental accommodations. The ac-
cused held a meeting of members of the association at which less than 20
percent of the membership attended. The membership did not constitute all
the landlords in the relevant market area. The meeting voted to recommend
an increase in rents for the following year in a specified amount. A letter to
this effect was written to the members of the association. The New Bruns-
wick Court of Queen's Bench (affirmed on appeal by the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal) held that such action did not violate the section in that it
must be shown that the accused possessed some means or power of achiev-
ing the desired result. In this case the accused had no such power. Indeed, in
the Court of Appeal decision it was doubted whether sec. 38 could ever be
applied effectively in a horizontal situation.
G. REVIEWABLE TRADE PRACTICES
Currently, the RTPC has civil jurisdictions over exclusive dealing, tied
selling, market restriction, refusal to deal, consignment selling, foreign
judgments, foreign laws and directives and refusals to supply by a foreign
supplier. There have been two principal contested cases decided under these
provisions, the first one dealing with an alleged exclusive dealing situation,
in which the application for relief was denied, and the second, which was a
tied selling case, where a prohibition order was issued. There has also been
one consent order in a refusal to deal case.
1. Exclusive Dealing
In Director of Investigation and Research v. Bombardier Ltd.86 an order
was sought from the RTPC to restrain Bombardier, a snowmobile manufac-
turer, from continuing to engage in the practice of exclusive dealing and to
require it to resupply those dealers whose franchises it had cancelled as a
consequence of the dealer's nonobservance of the exclusive dealing require-
ment in Bombardier's dealer franchise agreement. Under the relevant
provision the RTPC is authorized to make an order requiring the discon-
tinuance of the practice of exclusive dealing in a case where it finds that the
practice, because it is engaged in by a major supplier of a product in a market
or is widespread in a market, is likely to impede the entry of a firm into or its
expansion in a market with the result that competition is or is likely to be
lessened substantially.
85. (1982), 63 C.P.R. (2d) 140 (New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench); (1984) 78 C.P.R.
(2d) 102 (New Brunswick Court of Appeal).
86. (1981) 57 C.P.R. 216 (RTPC).
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In this case, there was no question that these were exclusive dealerships
and that Bombardier had enforced the exclusive dealing clause in the dealer
agreements. In addition the Commission found it to be a "major supplier"
with approximately 60 percent of all sales by manufacturers in Quebec and
the Maritimes and 40 percent in Ontario. However, it was not satisfied that
there was evidence of any substantial lessening of competition.
2. Tied Selling
The second case to receive a full hearing was Bureau of Broadcast
Measurement87 which involved a claim of tied selling. It was established in
evidence that Bureau of Broadcast Measurement (BBM) held a monopoly
position in the provision of radio audience survey data. It was also a supplier
of television audience survey data, in which field A. C. Nielsen was also a
competitor. The evidence established that BBM's price for the sale of both
radio and TV audience survey data was not only considerably less than if the
two surveys were purchased separately but also less than what a customer
would have to pay to purchase the radio survey data from BBM and the
television survey data from A. C. Nielsen.
The RTPC's jurisdiction to make an order against the practice of tied
selling is similar to its jurisdiction in respect of exclusive dealing. That is, it
may make such an order where the supplier in question is a "major supplier"
and where the effect of the practice is to create barriers to entry or expansion
in the market in question and thereby cause a substantial lessening of
competition. With 100 percent of the relevant national market for radio
audience survey data and upwards of 80 percent of the corresponding survey
data relating to television broadcasting, BBM was held to be a major
supplier of both products. The Commission considered that the technologi-
cal necessity defense which is available in tied selling cases was not appli-
cable in this case since it is to be confined to cases in which the reputation of
the tying product would be destroyed if the other product were not supplied
in conjunction with it. The Commission further concluded that there would
be, or was, substantial lessening of competition as a consequence of this
practice. In this regard it took note of the fact that there had been no new
entrants in the radio measurement service business for eighteen years and
that there were not any perceived potential entrants at the time of the
application. A. C. Nielsen's share of the TV market had fallen substantially in
the preceding ten years. The order of the Commission directing BBM to
discontinue such tied selling was subsequently upheld on appeal s7a to the
Federal Court of Appeal.
87. RTPC ANNUAL REPORT (for the year ended March 31, 1982), 29.
87a. BBM Bureau of Broadcast Measurement v. Director of Investigation and Research
(1984) 82 C.P.R. (2d) 60 (Federal Court of Appeal).
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3. Refusal to Deal
In December 1983 the Director applied to the RTPC for an order under
the refusal to deal provisions of the Act against seven major motion picture
film distributors in Canada. The order sought was to require the distributors
to supply commercially valuable motion pictures to an exhibition chain,
Cineplex, which operated multi-screened theatres in various communities
across Canada. The Director alleged that Cineplex was consistently denied
the opportunity of obtaining adequate supplies of first run motion pictures
with the result that it had suffered substantial financial detriment. He
further alleged that the major distributors of motion picture films in Canada
had maintained longstanding arrangements whereby they supplied motion
pictures to the two largest exhibition chains to the exclusion of the denied
firm and others.
However, in June 1983 the RTPC agreed to a request by the Director for a
one-year postponement of hearings on this application made as a conse-
quence of undertakings provided by the distributors whereby they agreed to
revise their distribution policies in Canada. The application was made under
sec. 31.2 of the Act which empowers the Commission to issue a remedial
order where a person is substantially affected in his business by inability to
obtain adequate supplies of a product on usual trade terms. Under the
terms of the undertakings, the distributors agreed to deal on an individual
theatre-by-theatre basis with respect to both first run and subsequent runs of
each motion picture. They also agreed to undertake not to be a party to any
agreement or arrangement with an exhibitor to determine the pattern of
release of each of its motion pictures nor to grant any exhibitor the right of
first refusal on its films. Subsequently, in July 1984, the Director discon-
tinued his application, partly as a result of the improved competitive situa-
tion resulting from the undertakings but also because Cineplex acquired one
of the two other major film exhibitors which had allegedly been given
preferred status in the distribution of the films by the major motion picture
companies.
VII. Resistance of Antitrust Extraterritoriality
In February 1985 the federal Parliament enacted the Foreign Ex-
traterritorial Measures Act. A predecessor version of this legislation was
first proposed (although not proceeded with) in 1980. Its provisions are
similar to so-called "blocking statutes" of other countries, including Austra-
lia and the United Kingdom. The enactment of this legislation is the cul-
mination of a number of prior efforts by various Canadian governments to
blunt the extraterritorial thrust into Canada of United States antitrust law.
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A. BUSINESS RECORDS PROTECTION
In 1947, a grand jury in the United States investigating the American
paper industry, subpoenaed International Paper Company, a New York
corporation, to produce documents under the control of certain affiliated
companies located in the Province of Quebec. The American court found
that one of these affiliates, Canadian International Paper, was doing busi-
ness in the American jurisdiction through an agent, and therefore ordered
the Company to produce documents within its control, even though they
were located in Canada. It was American compulsion of this kind which led
to the enactment in the 1950s of legislation in both Ontario and Quebec
severely restricting the removal of business records from the respective
jurisdictions. Statutes in both provinces prohibit the removal of corporate
records in compliance with any requirement, order, direction, or subpoena
of a legislative, administrative or judicial authority in a jurisdiction outside
each province.
In Ontario, sec. 1 of the Business Records Protection Act88 prohibits any
person in such circumstances from taking or removing from Ontario "mate-
rial in any way relating to business carried on in Ontario," unless such taking
or removal forms part of a regular practice of furnishing such material to a
head office or parent company located outside Ontario, or is otherwise
provided for by or under the laws of Ontario or Canada. Furthermore, sec. 2
of the Act provides for a procedure whereby the Minister of Justice, the
Attorney General or any other person having an interest in a business who
has reason to believe that a foreign order will be made requiring the removal
from Ontario of business records, may apply to the courts for an order
requiring any other person to furnish an undertaking and recognizance for
the purpose of ensuring that such person will not contravene the Act.
Anyone who, having received notice of such an application or who is
required to furnish an undertaking or recognizance, contravenes the Act, is
deemed to be in contempt of court and is liable to imprisonment for one
year.
B. ANTI-EXTRATERRITORIAL PROVISIONS OF COMBINES ACT
Prior to the enactment of the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, the
Act was amended in 1976 to protect Canadian citizens and corporations
from penalties and judgments imposed by foreign tribunals for actions taken
outside their jurisdiction. The relevant provisions of the Act are secs. 31.5
and 31.6.
88. R.S.O. 1980 c. 56, s.1.
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Under sec. 31.5, where the RTPC finds that the implementation in
Canada of a judgment, decree, order "or other process" issued by a foreign
tribunal would adversely affect competition, trade or commerce, foreign
trade or the efficiency of trade or industry in Canada, the Commission may
direct that no measures may be taken in Canada to implement the foreign
judgment, decree or order. Sec. 31.6 of the Act also empowers the Commis-
sion to block the implementation of a foreign law, directive or instruction
issued to a person in Canada from foreign persons, corporations or govern-
ments which would have such an adverse effect.
C. URANIUM INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATIONS
In the meantime a case arose which resulted in the promulgation of
federal regulations specifically aimed at preventing disclosure of docu-
ments, the production of which had been called for by a United States court.
In the mid-1970s Westinghouse brought an antitrust suit in Chicago against
twenty-nine American and foreign producers of uranium wherein it sought
treble damages of approximately $6 billion. Westinghouse alleged that these
producers had conspired to establish an artificially high world market price
for uranium. It was later ascertained that a five-nation cartel, involving
Canada, Australia, France, the United Kingdom and South Africa, was
formed during a meeting in Paris in 1972.
In the context of the various American antitrust actions, orders were
made for the production of documents located in Canada which were in the
possession or under the control of certain Canadian Crown corporations and
several Canadian subsidiaries of American parent corporations. In some
cases the Canadian subsidiaries were themselves defendants in the Amer-
ican litigation; in other cases they were not. The American corporations and
their subsidiaries took the position that these documents were necessary to
establish their defenses to the various actions launched against them in the
United States which related to the uranium cartel.
Nevertheless, the Canadian government intervened to prevent the disclo-
sure of these documents by passing the Uranium Information Security
Regulations under the authority of the Atomic Energy Control Act.8 9 The
Regulations provided, in part, as follows:
3. No person who has in his possession or under his control any note, document or
other written or printed material in any way related to conversations, discus-
sions or meetings that took place between January 1, 1972 and December 31,
1975 involving that person or any other person or any governmental, Crown
corporation, agency or other organization in respect of the production, import,
export, transportation, refining, possession, ownership, use or sale of uranium
or its derivatives or compounds, shall
89. R.S.C. 1970 c. A-19.
WINTER 1986
120 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
(a) release any such note, document or material or disclose or communicate
the contents thereof to any person, government, Crown corporation,
agency or other organization unless
(i) he is required to do so by or under a law of Canada, or
(ii) he does so with the consent of the Minister of Energy, Mines and
Resources .... 90
The obvious effect of these Regulations was to prohibit the disclosure of
the very documents which had been ordered produced by the American
courts. As a result, although the Canadian subsidiaries would willingly have
disclosed these documents in order to assist the American parent corpora-
tions in the context of the U.S. litigation, they were prevented from doing so
by the Regulations.
In order to avoid sanction orders in the American courts which could have
resulted in default judgments, or in the denial of the right to raise certain
defenses, Gulf Oil Corporation obtained orders from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and
from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
to issue "letters rogatory" addressed to the Canadian courts in an effort to
obtain those documents situated in Canada which supported Gulf's de-
fenses in the American proceedings. In March of 1980 in Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion v. Gulf Canada Ltd.9' the Supreme Court of Canada considered Gulf's
application for an order enforcing the letters rogatory in Canada.
The enforcement of letters rogatory in a recipient common law jurisdic-
tion depends primarily upon considerations of "comity." Rights based upon
foreign law will not be given effect if to do so would be "contrary to the
settled public policy of the forum ... or contrary to good morals or natural
justice or prejudicial to the state or its citizens." For this reason, Chief
Justice Laskin, speaking for the Supreme Court, extensively examined the
prevailing Canadian "public policy" relating to the disclosure of the relevant
documents in determining whether the Court's discretion should be exer-
cised to enforce the letters rogatory. Chief Justice Laskin concluded that
public policy equated with governmental policy, and found that the stated
policy of the Canadian government related not so much to a desire to
preserve secrecy, as it did to a growing opposition to the extraterritorial
application of American antitrust laws.
Chief Justice Laskin went on to cite, with approval, the dicta of Lord
Wilberforce of the House of Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. et al. v. Westing-
house Electric Corp. et al.
92
90. C.R.C. Vol. III c. 366, p. 2347.
91. (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 74 (Supreme Court of Canada).
92. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (House of Lords).
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It is axiomatic that in antitrust matters the policy of one state may be to defend
what it is the policy of another state to attack. The intervention of Her Majesty's
Attorney General establishes that quite apart from the present case, over a
number of years and in a number of cases, the policy of Her Majesty's Government
has been against recognition of United States investigatory jurisdiction against
United Kingdom companies. The courts should in such matters speak with the
same voice as the executive .... 93
As a result, the Court refused to enforce the various letters rogatory.
D. FOREIGN EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES ACT
This legislation is designed to prevent the recognition or enforcement in
Canada of foreign antitrust judgments, orders or legislation where, in the
opinion of the Attorney General of Canada and the Secretary of State for
External Affairs, to do so would "adversely [affect] significant Canadian
interests in relation to international trade or commerce involving a business
carried on in whole or in part in Canada, or that is likely to infringe Canadian
sovereignty.94
The Attorney General is also empowered, under the legislation, to pro-
hibit or restrict the production, disclosure or identification of records in the
possession or control of any person resident in Canada, or of any Canadian
citizen. Sec. 4 empowers the court to issue a warrant authorizing the seizure
of any such records where it is satisfied that a prohibition or restrictive order
may not be complied with. The legislation confers upon the Attorney
General the power to order persons or corporations situated in Canada not
to comply with extraterritorial measures taken by foreign governments. The
Attorney General is also empowered to prohibit Canadian foreign-owned
corporations from complying with directives issued by foreign parent cor-
porations pursuant to such foreign governmental measures.
Persons found to have contravened orders made under the legislation are
liable to fines of up to $10 thousand, and to imprisonment for up to five
years. Furthermore, sec. 9 provides for the recovery ("clawing back") from
a person in whose favor a foreign judgment is given, of any amount which
that person has obtained under the foreign judgment. The court ordering
such recovery is also empowered under sec. 9, to order the seizure and sale
of the shares of any corporation incorporated in Canada in which the person
against whom judgment is rendered pursuant to sec. 9 has a direct or indirect
beneficial interest.
93. Id., at 448.
94. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ss. 3 and 4.
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E. CANADA/U.S. ANTITRUST UNDERSTANDINGS
It would appear that the Canadian government, in addition to clothing
itself with the power to resist the extraterritorial application of American
antitrust laws by enacting the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act has also
taken steps to encourage a reduction in such extraterritoriality by entering
into various Memoranda of Understanding with the United States.
In 1958 the American Justice Department launched a civil action against
two United States companies, General Electric Corporation and Westing-
house Electric Corporation, and against N. V. Philips from the Netherlands.
All of these companies manufactured radio and television sets. The Justice
Department alleged that they had, acting through their Canadian sub-
sidiaries, engaged in an unlawful conspiracy by organizing a Canadian
patent pool (Canadian Patents Limited), which prevented the importation
into Canada of radio and television sets manufactured in the United States.
The Justice Department alleged that the Canadian market had been virtu-
ally closed to American manufacturers, and that as a result, American
consumers had been deprived of the lower prices which increased volumes
in the sales of such articles would have produced had the patent pool not
existed. This case caused great concern in Canada and precipitated discus-
sions between the Attorney General of the United States and the Minister of
Justice of Canada in 1959. An informal agreement relating to consultative
procedures between the two countries was reached, which is known as the
Fulton-Rogers Understanding of 1959.
In 1967, the O.E.C.D. Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices issued its Recommendation Respecting Consultation and Notifica-
tion. This Recommendation provided for notification and consultation by
member countries along the lines of the Fulton-Rogers Understanding of
1959. The Recommendation also envisaged active cooperation among par-
ticipating countries in the control of restrictive business practices affecting
international trade.
The O.E.C.D. Recommendation led to further discussions between the
Canadian and American governments with respect to extraterritorial anti-
trust enforcement. In November 1969, Ron Basford, then Canadian Minis-
ter of Justice, and John M. Mitchell, then United States Attorney General,
issued a joint communique confirming and extending the Fulton-Rogers
Understanding of 1959.
More recently, in March 1984 the two countries entered into a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (the Memorandum) 95 pertaining to notification,
consultation and cooperation with respect to the application of national
95. To be found in Appendix IX of the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (under the Act for
the year ended Mar. 31, 1984), 155-159 (1984).
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antitrust laws. The preamble to the Memorandum recognizes the close links
between the economies of the two countries, and the important differences
between each country on the appropriate level of extraterritorial application
of domestic antitrust laws. The stated purpose of the Memorandum is to
avoid or moderate conflicts of interests and policies, and to enhance coop-
eration in the enforcement of each country's antitrust laws.
Under the Memorandum, both countries have agreed to notify each other
whenever they become aware that their antitrust investigations or proceed-
ings involve the national interests of the other, or require the seeking of
information located in the territory of the other. The Memorandum pro-
vides for a consultative process wherein either country may request con-
sultations when it believes that an antitrust investigation, proceeding or
action is likely to affect its significant national interests or require the
seeking of information from within its territory.
The Memorandum stipulates that neither country will ordinarily discour-
age the other from seeking information located within its territory. Never-
theless, where one country finds that access to information within its terri-
tory is contrary to a significant national interest, the investigating party must
notify the other country and must engage in the process of consultation. By
way of broad statement of principle, the Memorandum stipulates that each
country will give "careful consideration to the significant national interests
of the other at all stages of an antitrust investigation, inquiry or prosecu-
tion." Each country is also expected to exchange information with the other
relating to antitrust enforcement activities.
VIII. Conclusion
After a slow start (now closing in on one hundred years), it would seem
that Canadian competition law is beginning to gain considerable momen-
tum. Recent and pending legislative reforms in this field, supported by
constitutional law decisions giving recognition to the federal government's
authority to enact civil-law based competition laws, strongly suggest that the
area of competition law in Canada is about to become a considerably more
significant factor than has previously been the case. In addition, many of the
obstacles to enforcement of an effective competition law (such as exclusively
criminal law-based legislation) are being removed. While it is unlikely that
Canadian competition laws will ever achieve the degree of importance in
everyday business life that the antitrust laws have in the United States, it is at
least safe to say that this is no longer an area that Canadian business will be
able to afford to ignore.
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